Slice Protocol Loses About $41K on Base After FundsModule Trusts Fake Payouts
By Crypto Wire
October 21, 2026
Security desks flagged a Slice FundsModule drain on Base on October 21, 2026, with TenArmor and SlowMist both putting net losses near $41,000 in ETH and USDC. Slice is an onchain commerce protocol whose “slicers” are decentralized stores whose ownership splits are ERC-1155 tokens. This is a Rug Room accounting-flaw chapter — not a bridge hack and not a marketplace listing bug.
SlowMist’s cut: the vulnerable FundsModule function (selector 0x9d2edfac) trusted release amounts reported by caller-chosen source contracts and did not verify that matching ETH or USDC had actually arrived. The attacker fed two self-deployed sources that reported nonzero releases while transferring nothing; with the immediate-withdraw flag set, the module paid those unbacked figures out of pooled reserves. Onchain notes from Sprunky add that a helper contract released 62 slicers into the module about a minute before the drain call. Named addresses in secondary wraps: attacker 0xc34572ebb26b9a4c54854aae8d2347108e8c892f, FundsModule proxy 0x61bcd1ed11fc03c958a847a6687b1875f5eacaaf, implementation 0x8db3b6f51b594dc87b87a3a3b844de9c0d8d60b5, helper 0x8ebc7878287415f1fadcf4ace8817094e4c86f90.
Pattern match, not novelty: the same “trust self-reported inflow” class showed up in SlowMist’s October notes on MALT (~$72K) and other small invariant fails. Slice had not posted a public incident statement at the time secondary desks wrote up the TenArmor alert. Treat ~$41K as the security-firm consensus loss, not a protocol-confirmed final tally, until Slice or a reconciled Basescan cluster says otherwise.
For NFT and marketplace desks, the useful cut is storefront-treasury hygiene on L2 commerce stacks: ERC-1155 revenue-split “slicers” still sit behind a pooled FundsModule that can mis-account if it believes fake inflows. Revoke unused approvals on Base commerce routers you no longer use, and do not treat a small dollar loss as “safe to ignore” if your slicer balance shares the same module.
What to watch on-chain next: Track hops from attacker 0xc345…892f, whether Slice pauses or upgrades the FundsModule proxy at 0x61bc…caaf, and whether TenArmor’s Basescan exploit hash gets a protocol post-mortem that revises the ~$41K figure.
Bottom line: Slice’s Base FundsModule paid ~$41,000 in ETH/USDC after trusting attacker-reported inflows that never arrived — a classic missing balance-check drain still awaiting a protocol statement.
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